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Introduction 
Much attention has been paid 
to the presence of the unconscious in 
McGuckian s work and to the dreamlike quality of her poetics,1 but she is rarely, 
if 
ever, discussed as a comic writer. There is, however, a comedie, playful quality 
to her 
work which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by any of the comic categories 
usually applied 
in literary analysis. Given the emphasis 
on the unconscious 
characteristics of her work, it appears fitting 
to look to theories of the same in search 
of a comic model with which to read her poetry. The primary processes of the 
unconscious are made manifest not only in dreams, but also in jokes 
? 
Freud 
contended that its operations 
are 
exemplified 
in dreams and the joke 
structure : If a 
joke 
is ?the contribution made to the comic by the unconscious,'3 then 
an 
exploration 
of the quality of the 
comic in her work can proceed along 
the lines of the joke 
mechanism. 
Freuds model of the joke-mechanism has been favoured by 
a number of 
commentators over the neurotic model' as a model for aesthetic analysis. In 
Psychoanalytic Aesthetics: the British School, Nicola Glover 
remarks that Freud's analysis 
of the structure of the joke mechanism 
can be considered 'an embryonic aesthetic, 
an 
alternative to his pathographic account' and goes 
on to quote Freud: 'te [the] first 
example of 
an 
application of the analytic mode of thought 
to the problems of 
aesthetics was contained in my book on jokes'.4 Glover argues that it is 
more useful as 
a 
starting point for the development of 
an aesthetic than the 
pathographic 
account' 
because it does not depend 
on the 
psychoanalytical interpretation of content, and 
on 
biographical detail, 
which can be a limited and often intrusive activity, but rather 
on 
the form of aesthetic processes. In this article I would like to suggest that readings 
which privilege McGuckians aesthetic 
as 
postmodern5 
or as that of ?criture f?minine ? 
or indeed as nonsense', are actually seduced away from the joke 
in her work by its 
employment of dream-work displacement, precisely because the form of her aesthetic 
is that of the joke-mechanism. 
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Jokes 
Jokers establish themselves as masters of discourse by marking 
their 
transgression 
of symbolic law and thus re-instate 
it. This 
procedure 
is described by 
Susan Purdie below: 
Joking paradigmatically involves 
a discursive exchange 
whose distinctive 
operation involves the marked transgression 
of the symbolic law and whose 
effect is thereby 
to constitute jokers 
as 'masters' of discourse: as those able to 
break and keep the basic rule of language, 
and consequently 
in 
controlling 
possession of full human subjectivity7 
Purdie suggests that both poetic language 
and jokes manifest themselves 
in 
similar ways 
? 
both exhibit an unusual attention to signifiers' 
and depend 
on a 
process of 
excess 
signification, which permits 
'release from the rule that 
signifiers 
must attach 'in ratio' to signified 
? 
the obverse of the stipulation 
that 
signifiers 
must 
extend one at a time across commensurate signifying spaces'.8 
Purdie accepts the premise that Freud's analysis of the joke-mechanism 
is a 
valid basis for the analysis of all aesthetic processes, but distinguishes 
between a poetic 
and a joking 
aesthetic proper, by suggesting that poetic discourse 
does not transgress 
symbolic law, because it performs recognisable symbolic 
functions. She argues that 
what is poetic but 
not 
funny constitutes 
a discourse where excess language 
is 
agreed 
to be (anomalously) 
a proper signification through 
its recuperation 
to some sort of 
special 
'truth' assumed to lie beyond 'ordinary' language; and 
so 
symbolic operation is 
reinstated because the violation is not really taken 
as a violation. Joking, 
in contrast, 
does involve a transgression of symbolic law and, 'as distinct from either poetic 
or 
phantasising discourses, always includes 
some marked transgression of the symbolic 
law 
? so that it fully breaches and fully re-instates that rule'.9 
This is an attractive 
distinction, and, as McGuckians work is not overtly funny, say, compared 
to that of 
Rita Ann 
Higgins 
or Julie O'Callaghan, 
is one which seems to situate McGuckians 
'excessive 
signification 
in terms of 
permitted poetic transgression 
of symbolic 
operations, and 
not in terms of comic functions. But as Purdie's inquiry 
concerns 
itself with elaborating 
a 
theory of jokes, and 
not 
poetic discourse, 
the contention that 
all poetic discourse breaches and re-instates symbolic law without perceived violation 
remains 
under-investigated. 
I would thus contend that as McGuckians work arguably 
'violates' symbolic law 
in a marked way, making 
one of the elements of her aesthetic 
that of the joke proper. 
Responses 
to McGuckians work suggest that it does indeed violate the 
symbolic law. Criticism of her work demonstrates that it has been received 
as 
occurring outside the 'agreement' that 
in 
poetic discourse 'excess language' 
constitutes 
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a proper signification'. 
The 
violating aspect 
of her aesthetic is perhaps best 
exemplified by those 
critics who react punitively 
to her work. In a common-sensicaT 
review of Selected Poems, Elizabeth Lowry ?vrites that 'disturbingly 
and rather 
irritatingly, McGuckians poems 
often create a 
parallel world, 
in which the 
signifiers 
have mutated and no longer correspond 
to their workaday meanings, 
so one has to 
guess what even the most ordinary words 
are 
supposed 
to denote....of course poetry 
can bend the rules of syntax, but 
even poetry can only bend them 
so far'.10 She has 
elsewhere been accused of deliberate obsfucation to the point of 
nonsense.11 Such 
accusations clearly miss the joke. Far from being the wilful stretching 
of 
language 
beyond 
even the endurance of poetic licence, her work's excess' 
can instead be 
productively 
read as a 
joking 
violation of symbolic law. 
One of the characteristic functions of the joke-mechanism is 
to 
formulaically 
divert attention away from the fact that some violation of symbolic law 
is about to be 
elicited [my emphasis]'12. 
If a 
joke 
is to elicit 
laughter 
instead of groans, it is important 
that we do not 'see the punchline coming, 
so to 
speak. Thus, the successful telling 
of 
a 
joke involves 
a 
'set-up', 
to seduce the listener into 
forgetting that 
a 
punchline 
is 
imminent. The punchline 
is the climax of the joke proper, what Freud calls the 
'tendentious joke' and 
which Glover describes as 
having 
Wo forms, the hostile and 
the obscene, the first giving 
the opportunity 
to express aggressiveness, satire, 
or 
defence', the second serving the purpose of 
an 
exposure'.13 The joke-mechanism 
in 
McGuckians work operates in both forms, but for the present argument, I will 
concentrate on her use of the second which serves the purpose of an exposure'. In 
other words, the exposure of something 
in McGuckians poetry is its punchline, 
or 
climax. In the case of McGuckians poetry, however, such 'exposure' is 
non 
teleologically experienced, 
as the reader s attention is diverted away at the same time at 
which the violation is enacted. As a result her work is not marked by funniness, 
as in 
the joke, for the diversion and climax, 
or 
exposure, do not 
occur 
contingently, but 
contiguously Janus-headed, 
the joke 
form is comprised of simultaneous set-ups and 
punchlines. 
In McGuckians work there are many 'jokes', but here 
I will concentrate on 
one of the things 
that is both hidden and revealed through the strategy of 
intertextuality 
? 
inter-textualiry itself. Her idiosyncratic 
use of syntax 'lead[s] readers 
astray'14 from her multi-layering of 
traces of other texts within her poems. Shane 
Murphy 
comes close to uncovering the set-up effect of her deliberate inter-textuality 
when he writes: 'McGuckians 'special language' 
is in fact, very often that of others 
refracted within her own text, the quotations giv[e] it 
the veneer of a dream 
language'.15 
he goes 
on: 
Faced with her idiosyncratic matrix of simile, metaphor and grammatical 
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peculiarities, 
one is prompted towards the reading 
which McGuckian herself 
has advocated, namely that of unconscious dreamwork.yet unconscious 
in 
this case needs to be kept within the confines of inverted 
commas. Less a re 
writing, 
more a 
reconfiguration.16 
The dreamlike quality 
in McGuckians work depends 
on a more 
complex 
interaction of elements than Murphy suggests, but his point is, for my purposes here, 
well taken. The multi-layering of 
texts does, indeed, create the 'veneer' of a dream, 
but by imitating 
the dream operation of displacement through dis-placement, 
rather 
than being configured by 
it. By dis-placing syntax and 
other texts, McGuckian diverts 
attention from the exposure that her work is indeed fully conscious and operates 
within the terms of symbolic law, and she is thus able 
to 
transgress it. 
The set-up in McGuckian's work is continuously marked by its 
own 
exposure. Regarding the 
use of other texts in her work Shane Murphy 
has written: 
'the very act of appropriation is thematically apt and is commented upon in the 
poems themselves'17. Such 
comment is much more than simply thematically apt 
? 
it 
is formally apt. In that her work embeds and diverts attention away from such 
appropriation, 
it 
thematically gestures towards 
a refusal of the symbolic law (by 
refusing 
to abide by the rules of legal ownership 
of 
language). 
It thus marks its refusal 
of the law through providing clues 
to ensure its own 
'exposure', and thus 
it 
transgresses, rather than refuses, the law and 
so takes the form of a joke. 
Thus responses which read her excessive signification 
as 
'meaningless' either 
negatively, 
as do 'common-sense' analyses, 
or 
positively, 
as do postmodern and 
feminist analyses which emphasises her 
use of ?criture 
f?minine, 
don't seem to get the 
joke. McGuckian's work signals that 
her 'words are traps,'18 and this fits with the 
description of'the work 
a 
joking mechanism performs' which 
is to 'trap' 
the audience 
into a situation where their proper activity of 'making sense' inevitably entails 
producing symbolic 
error.'19 
Readings 
which see McGuckian as 
exemplifying 
'woman 
speak' 
are diverted away from the continuous exposure of the fact that she is working 
within, and not without, the symbolic law. Postmodern commentary 
which reads her 
work as 
subverting the possibility 
of identity and meaning 
are seduced by the 
continuously diverted exposure of 
a 
meaningful joking self. 
What follows is a brief 
account of the ways in which these criticisms have 'been trapped', by 
the form of the 
joke, into producing 'symbolic error'. 
Eileen Cahill's analysis 
? 
which reads McGuckians refusal to signify within 
the 
agreed 
terms of symbolic function, 
not as a strategy, but 
as 
symbolic of 
a 'woman's 
writing'? has arguably produced 'symbolic 
error'. The essay suggests that because 
McGuckian 'sins against the laws of logic, syntax, congruity, grammar, causality, 
linear 
structure, and unity' her work 
can be understood as 
approximating] 
both Helen 
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Cixous' parler femme 
and ?criture f?minine, [and] achieving 
a female voice'.20 A 
thorough 
consideration of the complex differences between theories of 
a 
structurally 
differentiated woman's language 
are outside ths ambit of this article, but such theories 
can be summarised, briefly, 
as 
sharing 
a refusal to operate within the terms of 
symbolic 
law. 
Irigaray describes 
how such a syntax would formally operate: 'there 
would no longer 
be either subject 
or 
object, oneness' would 
no 
longer 
be 
privileged, 
there would no 
longer 
be proper meanings, proper names, proper' attributes'.21 
Clearly 
it is 
tempting 
to suggest that McGuckian 'parler femmes'. The 
content of her 
work does after all, appear 
to dissolve the boundaries between subject and object, and 
meanings, 
names and attributes do 'improperly 'occur, suggesting 
a refusal of 
symbolic 
law.22 
However, McGuckians relation to symbolic law is 
not 
quite that simple. 
Lacan contends that the symbolic law 
is constructed in and 
through language 
and 
that the imaginary 
? 
the repressed aspect of language 
? 
is feminine, and is 
manifested ordinarily 
in 
transgressions 
of 
linguistic operations. 
His pithy summary 
of 
why 
women thus have no remit as subjects within symbolic law 
is much quoted: 
'Women know not what they 
are 
saying, 
that's the whole difference between them 
and me'"23 Now this is clearly 
nonsense (and reader, you can take my woman's word 
for it) and is treated as such by McGuckian, who certainly knows what she is saying. 
In her poetry, the symbolic law is clearly represented 
as accessible to both women and 
men, and importantly 
as the site of her own articulation, rather than the imaginary 
In 'The Soil Map', for instance, the speaker desiring 
to be wedded to the poet is male. 
The poet embodies symbolic law, both 
as 
Queen Maeve (you 
are never without one 
man in the shadow/ of another'24), a sovereignty goddess 
to whom 
kings 
needed to be 
wed in order to 
legitimately rule, 
and as a poet who controls the function of 
symbolising. 
The husband to be is constituted as feminine, identifying himself, 
not as 
groom, but 
as 'bride'.25 Symbolic power is 
not understood as prescriptively 
masculinist, and access to it depends 
not on the gender of the speaker, 
but on their 
position in relation 
to it. McGuckian does not refuse symbolic law, but she does 
refuse the premise that 
it is inherently masculine. 
McGuckian not only knows what she is saying, she, 
more 
importantly, 
knows how she is saying it. Cahill's reading of McGuckian 
as 
refusing 
the symbolic 
law rests, amongst other things, 
on her assertion that McGuckians 
genius 
'resists both 
mimesis and symbolism'.26 However, McGuckians work is both mimetic and 
symbolic. She mimics the syntax of the unconscious 
or 
imaginary, and thus appears 
to 
refuse symbolic law, and this masks her formal symbolic transgression. McGuckians 
act of mimesis, or imitation operates, 
as 
argued above, 
in the symbolic 
realm of 
appropriation of language, 
and thus 
ownership 
of identity. And this is in direct 
contradistinction to a feminine syntax which would instead 'preclude any distinction 
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of identities, any establishment of ownership, 
thus any form of appropriation'.27 
Moreover, as a formal joker, McGuckian's work 
cannot 
exemplify 'feminine' syntax 
because, as Purdie pertinently points out, 
in such a discourse where the boundaries 
between the imaginary 
and the symbolic 
are dissolved 
? 
and therefore no marked 
transgression 
of the symbolic law 
is available? joking 
is not 
possible.28 
Such mimesis of 
'meaninglessness' 
? 
within the terms of symbolic law 
? 
is 
understood as seduction in Thomas Docherty's 'Temper, Initiations, Seductions: 
Postmodern McGuckian'.29 The excess signification' 
is read as performing the 
function of persistently de-stabilising meaning 
in the face of trying 
to 'make sense' of 
it: 'each poem is, as it were, a threshold inviting 
the initiation of its reader into some 
meaning; yet it also denies that meaning 
at the very instant of its perception'.30 
Seduction is understood here, after Baudrillard, to 'describe a state of relation between 
powers 
or forces, and one which explicitly forbids production'.31 Docherty reads the 
'play 
of forces'32 in McGuckian's poetry 
as seduction itself, whereas, seduction is in fact 
only 
one of the forces in play. 
This allows him to assert that seduction formally 
governs her aesthetic: 'the form this takes is 
one of seduction ,33 The effect of this is to 
invalidate the possibility 
of 
producing identity 
in and through 
her work: 'rather than 
subscribing 
to some desire to identify what is produced, McGuckian prefers 
to work 
at the level of seduction itself.... this way she questions the modern belief in the 
availability of identity'.34 Docherty 
can thus argue that 'all here is image: there is 
no 
presence, only representations'35 
and so contend that her poetry interrogates 
an 
aesthetics of identity. Seduction 
as form precludes the possibility of effective agency 
within the symbolic law, 
to the opposite effect of the joke's marked transgression, 
which far from 
forbidding production, actually produces 
the joker's 'controlling 
possession of full human subjectivity'. 
McGuckian's work may resist producing identity 
in seduction, but identity 
is 
'produced' through 
the 
telling 
of a joke. McGuckian 
can thus be understood not as a 
postmodern seductress, identity's destructress 
so to 
speak, but 
as a 
joker. McGuckians 
joke-mechanism does 
not 
rely 
on a 
process of chronological set-up 
and 
punchline, 
so 
when she is constituted as a joking subject 
within the symbolic law, 
it is not as a 
master of discourse. Nor does joking establish 
her as a seductive mistress of discourse, 
but instead as one of its sovereignty goddesses 
? as one 
through whom symbolic 
power is generated. Critics wedded 
to her work legitimise 
their own 
problematics of 
'meaninglessness', by attending 
to its excess 
signification'; joking does, after all, entail 
'discursive exchange. 
It is thus through 
the activity of critical discursivity that the joke 
is produced 
? 
her work 
jokingly 
resists 
valorising 
these critical 
'meanings' of 
meaninglessness. 
Its 'excess 
signification 
is not nonsense, nor woman speak, 
nor 
postmodern seduction 
? 
it is one of the means by which she jokes, and the joke is 
on us. The fundamental distraction in her work is from the exposure of the joke 
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mechanism itself. The joke that McGuckian both tells and hides, is that she is joking 
? 
but not, and this is critical, only joking. 
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